




Branching-time is a popular theory of time that is intended to account
for the openness of the future. Generally, branching-time models the open-
ness of the future by positing a multiplicity of concrete alternative futures
mirroring all the possible ways the future could unfold. A distinction is
drawn in the literature among branching-time theories: those that make use
of moment-based structures and those that employ history-based ones. In
this paper, I introduce and discuss a particular kind of openness relative
to the possibility that time ends (Doomsday). I then show that whereas
moment-based branching structures cannot represent this kind of openness,
history-based structures can account for it. The conclusion is that history-
based structures score a point over moment-based ones.
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1 Introduction
The future, it is commonly thought, is open in a way the past isn’t. For instance,
it is normally believed that the future, unlike the past, holds various alternative
possibilities. When thinking about the next days, weeks or years, it is natural to
assume that there are multiple possible ways our collective and individual futures
might be, whereas the same does not hold for the past. Moreover, it is com-
monplace to hold that the future, unlike the past, is not completely decided yet.
Whereas it is now established what happened one year ago, it is not decided yet
which future, among the possible ones, will turn out to be our future. Although
the vast majority of philosophers of time tend to agree with the idea that the future
is in some way or another open, there is disagreement about how the openness
of the future should exactly be understood, and what metaphysical theories of
time best characterize this openness. The various theories of time in the literature
model differently the openness of the future and have different understanding of
what the openness itself amounts to (see Torre 2011 and Grandjean 2021 for an
overview of the debate). Here, I will focus just on one of those theories of time,
viz. a branching conception of time.
Branching-time holds, pictorially, that our world has the shape of a tree, as
it branches from a single trunk in the direction of the future. In such a view,
and from a perspective of a moment m, the past of m is represented as a single
line of moments, whereas ahead of m we have a future of possibilities—several
alternative futures that all stem from the unique past of m. One of the distinc-
tive features of branching-time is that these alternative futures are taken to be
concrete—according to branching-time, the alternative futures exist as concrete
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entities and are ontologically on a par with the past (and with respect to each
other). The resulting picture is one where what is temporally possible does exist
somewhere in the tree-like structure which is the world. Accordingly, branching-
time models the openness of the future via the existence of this multiplicity of
alternative futures, all belonging to the same tree-shaped world.1
Branching-time theories can be divided in two categories: those that use history-
based structures and those that use moment-based structures. (I borrow the termi-
nology from Grandjean & Pascucci 2021.) In a nutshell, the two approaches
differ on how we treat one of the essential concepts of branching-time, viz. that of
a history. Roughly, a history represents a single possible course of events within
the many given by the branching structure. A history can be thought of as one of
the complete developments of the world—pictorially, one linear path within the
branching tree. In the case of moment-based branching structures, histories are
not a fundamental aspect of reality. Rather, they supervene on the set of moments
composing the tree and the fundamental earlier-later relation over them. In the
case of history-based branching structures, on the other hand, what histories there
are is one of the primitive features of a branching world. That is, in the context of
history-based structures, histories are seen as one of the fundamental entities that
compose temporal reality.
There is a debate about whether one should prefer moment-based or history-
1Branching-time can be cashed out in different alternative versions. Here I am going to use the
label ‘branching-time’ for any theory of time that posits the existence of a multiplicity of alterna-
tive futures. In this broad sense, branching-time includes: i) standard B-theoretical branching-time
(e.g., Thomason 1970, Belnap et al. 2001, and MacFarlane 2003), ii) A-theoretic versions of
branching-time where the passing of time eliminates some branches (McCall 1976), and iii) the-
ories where one of the alternative futures is metaphysically privileged, viz. it is the Thin Red Line
(e.g., Øhrstrøm 2009, Malpass & Waver 2012, and Borghini & Torrengo 2013). What I am going
to argue in this paper applies to all these versions of branching-time.
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based structures. Part of the debate revolves around which option fares better in
representing metaphysical possibilities with respect to temporal openness. In this
paper, I will consider a special case of temporal openness related to the possibility
that time itself ends (Doomsday). I will argue that history-based structures score a
point over moment-based one, insofar as the former but not the latter can represent
the doomsday scenario I will discuss.2
The point I am going to make, viz. that moment-based structures cannot repre-
sent a particular kind of Doomsday scenario while history-based ones can, might
seem too modest. However, it has its own philosophical significance. First of all,
branching-time in general is a widespread approach which is used to model both
technically and metaphysically the openness of the future. Secondly, the notion
of a history plays a crucial role within branching-time. Moreover, the distinction
between moment-based structures and history-based ones is not just a technical
one. On the contrary, the two approaches have different metaphysical and onto-
logical commitments. The way we understand histories—either as fundamental
and primitive aspects of reality or as derivative entities that entirely depend on
moments of time and the relation among them—does make a difference in our un-
derstanding of what constitutes temporal reality (see also Zanardo 2006: 381 on
this point). Finally, my point has to do with the notion of descriptive adequacy, as
long as I will argue that history-based structures can represent a kind of Doomsday
scenario while moment-based ones cannot. When trying to establish what views
of reality one should hold, descriptive adequacy is a fundamental parameter both
from a technical and a metaphysical viewpoint. That is, we want our theoretical
2Loss (2019) argues that Doomsday scenarios can be problematic for another theory of time
that is intended to account for the openness of the future, viz. the growing block theory of time.
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models to be able to represent scenarios that seem to be genuine possibilities. If
I am right in what follows, this paper shows that moment-based structures have
a problem with descriptive adequacy with respect to the Doomsday case I will
discuss, whereas history-based structures do not.
Roadmap. In section 2, I will briefly recap some technicalities of branching-
time, as well as the distinction between history-based and moment-based branch-
ing structures. In section 3, I will present and discuss some literature about the
debate on moment-based structures versus history-based ones. Next, in section 4,
I will present my example about Doomsday and show why this Doomsday sce-
nario favors history-based structures over moment-based ones.
2 Some Preliminaries
Throughout the paper, I will make use of the temporal Ockhamist semantics (Prior
1967). Although the points I am going to make do not depend on the nature of the
Ockhamist semantics, I will adopt the Ockhamist semantics as it is a common and
convenient way to formalize modal-temporal claims in the context of branching
time. In this section, I will quickly recap some of its main tenets, as well as two
important principles of branching-time structures, viz. no backward branching
and historical connectedness. I will first introduce the Ockhamist semantics in
the context of moment-based branching structures, as moment-based branching
structures are somewhat the standard ones, whereas toward the end of the section
I will illustrate the difference between moment-based structures and history-based
ones. What follows draws heavily from Belnap et al. (2001) and Øhrstrøm &
Hasle (2020). The reader already familiar with these formalities can skip this
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section.
To start, let us introduce a temporal language L which includes an infinite set
of non-tensed atomic sentence letters p,q,r . . ., the standard connectives → and
¬, the temporal operators P (‘it was the case that. . . ’) and F (‘it will be the case
that. . . ’), and the necessity operator . The dual operators H (‘it was always the
case that. . . ’), G (‘it will always be the case that. . . ’), and the possibility operator
♦ are defined in the usual manner as ¬P¬, ¬F¬, and ¬¬ respectively. The
grammar is defined recursively in a standard way. Next, a Branching-Time Model
(BTM) is defined as an ordered triple, 〈T,≤,T RUE〉, where T is a non-empty
set of moments, ≤ is a binary, transitive, and reflexive at-least-as-earlier-than
relation over T , and T RUE is a two place-function that assigns either 1 (true)
or 0 (false) to couples of moments/atomic sentence letters. Once we defined the
reflexive at-least-as-earlier-than relation, we can define the irreflexive earlier-than
relation (<) as follows: for any m,m′ in T , m < m′ iff m≤ m′ and m 6= m′. (In the
rest of the article, I will mostly use the <-relation). Histories are then defined as
maximally ordered sets of <-related moments of T—intuitively, a history is one of
the many possible complete developments of the world. To ensure no backward
branching, it is imposed that the relation ≤ satisfies the condition that for any
moment m,m′,m′′ in T , if m≤ m′′ and m′ ≤ m′′ then either m≤ m′ or m′ ≤ m. To
grant connectedness across the structure, it is imposed that for any moments m,m′
there is a moment m′′ such that m′′ ≤ m and m′′ ≤ m′—intuitively, this guarantees
that if you go back enough from any two distinct branches, you will find at some
point a shared trunk.
This said, the Ockhamist evaluation function V assigns truth values to well-
formed formulas relative to a BTM-model. More precisely, truth values are as-
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signed relative to couples of a moment m and a history h passing through m.
Where φ and ψ are any wff of L:
• if φ is an atomic sentence letter, V (φ) = 1 at m/h iff T RUE(φ ,m) = 1
• V (¬φ) = 1 at m/h iff V (φ) = 0 at m/h.
• V (φ → ψ) = 1 at m/h iff V (φ) = 0 at m/h or V (ψ) = 1 at m/h.
• V (Fφ) = 1 at m/h iff V (φ) = 1 at m′/h for some m′ ∈ h with m < m′.
• V (Pφ) = 1 at m/h iff V (φ) = 1 at m′/h for some m′ ∈ h with m′ < m.
• V (φ) = 1 at m/h iff for all h′ such that m ∈ h′, V (φ) = 1 at m/h′.
In short, formulas that do not feature the necessity or the possibility operator
get their moment/history evaluation based on what happens only on that history.
Formulas that instead do feature a reference to what is possible or necessary—
the kind of claims I will here be mostly interested in—require one to check what
happens in other histories passing through the moment of evaluation.
What said so far summarizes the Ockhamist semantics in the context of moment-
based branching-time structures. In the case of history-based structures, what
changes is how we construe the branching-time models. Whereas in the case
of moment-based structures the models are defined as an ordered triple 〈T,<
,T RUE〉, in the case of history-based structures we have a fundamental parameter
that represents the set of all histories. An example of a history-based approach
is that of Bundled Trees (Zanardo 2006 and 2006a for an overview). In bundled
tree approaches, histories are taken to be primitive entities. One fundamental pa-
rameter of the model, viz. the bundle B, specifies what histories are admitted in
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a given branching structure. A bundle B on T is usually described as the set of
histories with the property that, for every m in T , there is a history h such that
m ∈ h (Zanardo 2006a: 489).
To sum up, in moment-based structures, what histories there are completely
depends on the set of moments T together with the <-relation among moments,
as histories are defined as maximally ordered sets of <-related moments. That is,
once the set T and the <-relation are defined in a given Branching-Time Model,
we automatically acquire the set of histories in the model. In history-based struc-
tures, on the other hand, histories need not be maximally ordered sets of <-related
moments, and what histories there are is specified by the model. Crucially, in the
context of history-based structures, one can omit from the set of histories some
sets of moments that would normally count as histories in the moment-based ap-
proach. Here ends this section, as this should be enough for our purposes.
3 History-based versus moment-based structures
There is an open debate on what should be preferred between moment-based and
history-based branching structures. One of the aspects of the debate revolves
around the following aspect, viz. which one between the two structures fares
better with respect to representing scenarios that, from an intuitive viewpoint,
constitute genuine metaphysical possibilities.
For instance, Øhrstrøm and Hasle (1994: 268-269) argue that moment-based
structures face problems with respect to a particular scenario.3 Consider the fol-
lowing two sentences.
3Their example is based on that of Nishimura (1979).
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(1) Inevitably, if today there is life on earth, then either this is the last day (of
life on earth) or the last day will come.
(2) At any possible day at which there is life on earth, it is possible that there
will be life on earth the following day.
(1) conveys the idea that life on earth cannot go on forever—the last day of
life on earth should eventually come—whereas (2) states that if there is life, there
is a possibility for the continuation of life at least until the next day. Next, with
q standing for ‘there is life on earth’ and with days as units of time, (1) can be
formalized as q→ (G¬q∨F(q∧Hq∧G¬q)) for all m/h (given the ‘inevitably’
operator), and (2) as q→ ♦F(1)q for all m/h (given that it holds at all days).4
Øhrstrøm and Hasle judge (1) and (2) to be compatible, i.e. not contradictory. If
the two are indeed compatible and hold at all m/h pairs, there could then be a
branching structure where (1) and (2) are both true at all moment/history pairs.
Consider such a structure and imagine that at m0/h1 q and ¬G¬q are the case. It
follows, in virtue of (1), that there is another day later than m0 where the last day
on earth comes, i.e. a moment m1 where, relative to the pair m1/h1, q∧Hq∧G¬q
is the case—life on earth ends at m1 on the history h1. However, as q is the case
at m1, it is also the case that ♦F(1)q, in virtue of (2). This implies that there
must be a day following m1, on a further history h2, where q.5 Let us name this
moment m′2. But as q is the case at m
′
2, it follows via (1) that at the pair m
′
2/h2,
G¬q∨F(q∧Hq∧G¬q). Hence either m′2 is the last day of life on earth relative to
4Notice that the formalization of (2) features the metric version of the temporal operator F .
F(n)p must be read as ‘it will be the case in n units of time that p’. I will use the metric temporal
opearor in other examples throughout the paper. For the sake of brevity, I will not here recap how
a metric can be imposed on a branching structure. The reader interested in the details of this can
look at, among others, Belnap et al. (2001: 195-6) and Spolaore and Gallina (2020: 102-3).


















Figure 1 – The thickest parts of the tree are parts at which there is no life on earth,
i.e. where ¬q is the case.
h2 or down the road of h2 we have a moment m2 where q and, relative to the pair
m2/h2, q∧Hq∧G¬q is the case, as well as ♦F(1)q (because of (2)). In virtue
of the truth of the latter formula, there must be a day following m2 on a further
history h3, where q. . . It is easy to see that this process can just be applied over
and over (see fig. 1).
Consider then the set of moments in the lower part of the structure in the figure.
This set is constituted only by moments at which there is life on earth. Moreover,
this set is a maximally ordered set of <-related moments, and hence in the context
of moment-based structures it constitutes a history—let us name it hl . By adopting
moment-based structures it thus follows that, contra the initial assumption, (1) is
not true at the pair m0/hl , as q is the case at m0, yet life on earth never ends on
hl . We thus have a contradiction, as we started by assuming that (1) and (2) were
true at all moment/history pairs, whereas we end up having that (1) is not true at
m0/hl . This, in Øhrstrøm and Hasle’s view, shows that moment-based structures
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fail to represent the possibility of a branching world where (1) and (2) are both the
case. On the other hand, in history-based structures, the set of <-related moments
that we are calling hl can be excluded by the set of histories, thereby avoiding the
contradiction and making (1) and (2) compatible.
Belnap et al. (2001: 199-201) discuss a similar example and draw a different
conclusion. They start by considering a branching world where the following is
the case at all moment/history pairs.
(3) As long as there is life on earth, (i) life on earth might end before the next
day, and (ii) life on earth might not end before the next day.
This means that if there is life on earth at a given day, it is open whether life
on earth will continue the next day.6 We can formalize (3) as q→ (♦F(1)q∧
♦F(1)¬q). They then argue that from (3), it follows
(4) every life-on-earth chain of length n can be extended to a life-on-earth chain
of length n+1.
Next Belnap et al. consider the following claim
(5) At m0, it is necessary that life on earth will end after a finite number of days.
According to them, (4) and (5) are incompatible. That is, one cannot hold
both without contradicting themselves. This, in fact, is the case if the branching
6Their example is actually about a radium atom that might or might not decay. I illustrate
their argument in terms of life on earth possibly ending to highlight the parallels with the previous
case. Moreover, their argument is explicitly intended against advocates of bundled trees (see end
of section 2). I take it, though, that their argument can generalize towards any structure where the
set of histories is a fundamental parameter of the model, i.e. history-based structures according to
the terminology followed in this paper.
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structure at play is a moment-based structure. This is because in the context of
moment-based structures, the sequence of moments in the lower part of the struc-
ture (see the figure 2) constitutes a maximally ordered sets of <-related moments,
i.e. a history, where there is always life on earth. This makes the claim (5) false—
it is not inevitable at m0 that life will end, as there is a history passing through
m0, viz. hl , where life does not end. On the other hand, the claim (4) holds true
in general in the structure. In fact, any chain of life on earth of length n can, in
a temporal modal sense, extend to a chain of lenght n+ 1. That is, if you pick a
life-on-earth chain reaching an arbitrary lenght n at a moment m, there always is in
the structure a history passing through m where the life-on-earth chain has lenght
n+1. This result, the fact that (4) turns out to be true, whereas (5) turns out false,
is in accordance with the judgment that the two are contradictories. However,
Belnap et. al note that if we switch to history-based structures, we could decide
to ignore the history hl , i.e. we could decide that the maximally ordered sets of
moments that we are calling hl is not one of the histories of the model. If so, (5)
would be true, as in all histories stemming from m0 life on earth ends after a finite
number of days, and (4) would still be the case. That is, by switching to history-
based structures, we could make (4) and (5) compatible, although, in their view,
they should not and cannot be compatible. This, they argue, is a disadvantage of
the history-based structures.
Before moving on, let us notice that one could have reasons to criticize both
arguments. In the case of Øhrstrøm and Hasle’s argument, one might object that
the starting intuition on which the argument is built can be hard to accept. That
is, one might argue that from an intuitive viewpoint, (1) and (2) should not be












Figure 2 – The thickest parts of the tree are parts at which there is no life on earth,
i.e. where ¬q is the case.
by a further day where there is still life on earth, as per (2), it seems that there
can be a complete development of the world where life never ends. This seems to
imply, contra the intuition of Øhrstrøm and Hasle, that (1) simply cannot be true
too, as it might be that the last day of life on earth will not come. On the other
hand, one might also criticize the spirit of the argument put forward by Belnap
et al.. For instance, Zanardo (2006: 394) argues that their intuition according to
which (4) and (5) are incompatible is based on the presupposition of moment-
based branching structures. Moreover, even if we grant them that (4) and (5) are
truly intuitively incompatible and that this intuition is not affected by some former
presupposition, it is unclear why this should constitute a conclusive objection to
history-based structures. It is certainly correct that (4) and (5) could in principle be
made compatible within history-based structures by deciding to not consider the
lower set of <-related moments a history. However, it is unclear why one should
not consider that set a history. After all, a supporter of history-based structures
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might very well say that, absent particular reasons, one should consider a maximal
set of <-related moments a history, and that in the example by Belnap et al., there
is no reason to not consider hl a history. If that is the case, the argument by Belnap
et al. fails to conclusively show that moment-based structures have an advantage
here. At any rate, I do not want to further discuss the two arguments.7 Rather, in
the next section, I want to put forward a new argument that scores a point in favor
of history-based structures.
4 Doomsday and Branching-time
In this section, I am going to provide an example that seems to score a clear
point in favor of history-based structures. The scenario described in the example
is not going to be about the end of life on earth, as the previous one, but about
the end of time itself, i.e. Doomsday. I will argue that the scenario is a genuine
metaphysical possibility, and I will show that it can be represented by history-
based structures but not by moment-based ones. As the example involves a case
of temporal openness with respect to Doomsday, I will first take a brief detour into
two different general kinds of temporal openness with respect to the future.
The future can be open in at least two ways. For instance, say that Anne has
never eaten frozen yogurt up to a moment m, and in some continuations of m she
eats frozen yogurt at some point, whereas she never does in others. With respect
to this case, we can say that it is open at m whether Anne will eat frozen yogurt.
Anne might eat frozen yogurt, as she very well might not. Let us use the label of
7For another take on this example about life on earth, see Thomason (1984: 151-52). See also
the already mentioned article by Grandjean & Pascucci (2021) for an application of the example
to programming and computational contexts.
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absolute openness for this kind of openness. As for the second kind of openness,
consider Bob, who, unlike Anne, can’t resist frozen yogurt. At m it is inevitable,
hence not open, that sooner or later Bob will eat frozen yogurt again. However,
in some continuations of m Bob eats frozen yogurt after one day, whereas in other
continuations he does so after two days. In this case, although at m it is inevitable
that Bob will eat frozen yogurt, it is open when this will happen. He might eat
frozen yogurt in one day, as he might very well do it in two days instead. Let us
use the label of relative openness for this second kind of openness.
It should be clear how branching-time can easily model the two frozen yogurt
scenarios. For instance, in the case of absolute openness, one just needs at least
one history passing trough m where Anne eats frozen yogurt and at least another
one where she never does so. Similarly for the case of relative openness. We
need that in all histories passing through m, Bob eats frozen yogurt after m. And,
we also need at least one history passing through m where Bob eats frozen yo-
gurt one day after m but not two days after m, and at least another history where
the opposite takes place. This works fine independently of whether one assumes
moment-based or history-based structures.
Let us now see what happens when we introduce the possibility that time
ends (Doomsday). As far as relative and absolute openness are concerned, both
moment-based and history-based structures can represent open doomsday scenar-
ios. To do so, we need branching structures to contain endpoints, where a moment
m is an endpoint iff for no moment m′ in T , m < m′. We can take an endpoint to
be a moment at which G⊥ is true (see Meyer 2015), as ending points are the
only points where the formula would result (vacuously) true—⊥ stands for an ar-
















Figure 4 – Doomsday and relative openness.
absolute openness where it is open at m whether Doomsday will come. To repre-
sent this, one needs at least one history passing through m featuring an endpoint
later than m and at least another one not featuring an endpoint (see fig. 3). In
such a scenario, at m/h1 (and at m/h2 too) ♦FG⊥ and ¬FG⊥ are both true—it
is possible but not necessary that time will end. Likewise for relative openness.
If at m it is inevitable that time will end but it is open when, we need that all
histories passing through m have endpoints and those endpoints are at different
temporal distances from m (see fig. 4 for an example). In the example, at m/h1
(and at m/h2 too) FG⊥, ¬F(1)G⊥, ¬F(2)G⊥, ♦F(1)G⊥, and ♦F(2)G⊥
are all true—although it is inevitable that Doomsday will come, it is open when it
will. Again, this works well independently of whether we adopt history-based or
moment-based models, as both can feature endpoints.
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However, consider this further case of Doomsday openness. It might be the
case that, at one specific moment, say m, it is open whether the world continues or,
rather, ends right at m. People await in trepidation, wanting to know whether it is
Doomsday or whether they will ever enjoy frozen yogurt again. It is possible that
time ends right at m, but that is not necessary. The world might end right at m, as
it might very well continue. At the moment m, it would be true to say something
along the lines of
(6) this present moment might be Doomsday.
In this scenario, we are faced with a kind of temporal openness that seems to
be distinct from what I am labeling absolute and relative openness. In the case
of absolute and relative openness, the openness is completely future-oriented. It
is open at some moment what will be the case— whether or when someone will
eat frozen yogurt, whether or when it will be Doomsday, and so on. In the latter
example instead, the openness is still future-oriented—will the world continue?—
but it somewhat regards the present too. From the perspective of some moment m,
it is open whether the present moment m is Doomsday—m might or might not be
Doomsday. Moreover, this kind of openness has this further peculiarity. Normally,
a moment m in a branching structure does not contain any type of indeterminacy.
For instance, it would not make sense to say that it is open at a moment m whether
Bob eats frozen yogurt at m. What events there are at m is completely determinate.
In the case of the example at hand, though, it does make sense to say that it is open
at m whether m is Doomsday. Thus, this seems to be a further kind of openness,
which differs from what I am labeling absolute and relative openness. Let us then
introduce the new label of present openness for it.
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It should here be noted that this scenario of present openness seems to be a
perfectly legitimate metaphysical possibility. Why could it not be the case that a
world is such that at a very specific moment, or at several moments, it is an open
possibility that the world itself ends? Perhaps we can think of worlds where the
laws of nature make it the case that at some special moments it is indeterminate
whether the world itself continues or not. It is then natural to expect that it is a
duty of a satisfactory theory of the openness of the future to be able to account for
such a scenario.8
So, how can branching-time models account for present openness and ground
the truth of claims such as (6)? We might be tempted to say that given that we
are trying to model the open possibility that time ends at m, i.e. the possibility
that there is no time after m, we could use an absence of branches to represent
the possibility that m has no continuation. We might then picture in our head a
structure like the one represented in fig. 5. However, we should not be deceived by
the impression of a missing branch stemming from m in fig. 5. If there is a missing
branch at m, to use words in a way that Quine would have not liked, then there
are missing branches at all other moments. Hence, it cannot be that the absence
of a branch at m grounds the possibility that time ends at m, as this would be the
case at moments other than m too—moments at which, let us assume, Doomsday
is not a possibility. Hence resorting to absent branches cannot be of any help in
modeling present openness.
8Notice also that a contender of branching-time, i.e. divergent possible worlds à la Lewis 1986,
has no problem with accounting for this case of present openness. We just need two possible
worlds that are qualitatively identical up to a moment m, and such that one ends at m whereas
the other one continues afterwards. There thus seems to be some theoretical pressure toward





Figure 5 – A seemingly absent branch.
To have a grip on what is needed, let us notice that, in very general terms,
branching-time models temporal openness by positing the existence of different
histories where different things occur. Hence, it seems that in this case we need
one history where m is the last moment of time (Doomsday), and a further history
where the world continues after m. The difficulty of course is that m needs to be
part of both those histories. It might then seem that we are running toward a con-
tradiction where m both is and is not the last moment of time. The way out of the
contradiction, and the way to model present openness too, is to resort to what we
might call broken histories. Roughly, a broken history is a set of moments which
somewhat has a last moment and also has later moments according to the funda-
mental earlier-than relation. More precisely, a broken-at-m history (in symbols,
h∗m) is a subset of T such that i) it is the union of m and all the moments earlier
than m ii) it has upper bounds in T (i.e. moments later than m according to the
fundamental earlier-than relation).9 Once the possibility of broken histories is in-
troduced, one can model the case of present openness as in fig. 6. The moment m
belongs both to the history h1 and to the broken history h∗m. At the pair m/h1, it is
not Doomsday, G⊥ is false. At the pair m/h∗m, on the other hand, it is Doomsday,
G⊥ is true. So, at m/h1 (and at m/h∗m too) ♦G⊥ and ¬G⊥ are both true—at m,
9Notice that according to this definition, the histories h1 in fig. 3, and the histories h1 and h2 in





Figure 6 – Present openness and broken histories. The vertical line at m represents
the end of the broken history h∗m.
it is possible but not necessary that it is Doomsday. In other words, m might be
Doomsday. The result is that by making use of broken histories, we can represent
the scenario of present openness.
However, it should be noted that we can make theoretical room for broken
histories only within the context of history-based structures. In fact, in the case of
moment-based structures, something is a history only if it is a maximally ordered
set of <-related moments in T . And, a broken-at-m history cannot be a maximal
set of <-related moments, as by definition a broken-at-m history requires the ex-
istence of moments in T that are later than m. On the other hand, history-based
structures have the leeway to include broken histories within a model, as in those
structures what histories there are is a fundamental parameter of the model. Since
the employment of broken histories is necessary to represent present openness, it
follows that moment-based structures cannot represent the case of present open-
ness, whereas history-based ones can.10 Given that the case of present openness
10One might have some qualms toward the idea that a moment m of a broken-at-m history can
rightly be considered a Doomsday moment. After all, by the very definition of a broken history,
there must be moments after m. How can then m be a Doomsday moment? If one agrees with this
point, then the case of present openness becomes an objection to branching-time itself, insofar as
it would not matter whether we cash it out in terms of moment-based or history-based structures.
Branching-time could simply not represent the case of present openness. Here I do not want to
pursue this line of thought, as my general point is that if one adopts branching-time to model
temporal openness, then the case of present openness favors history-based versions of branching-
20
is, I argued, a genuine metaphysical possibility, moment-based structures face
a problem here. The genuine metaphysical possibility of present openness can
be represented by history-based structures, but not by moment-based structures.
Hence, history-based structures score a point over moment-based ones.
5 Conclusion
Before concluding, let us notice that the present openness scenario is different in
nature from the example about life on earth discussed in section 3. In that discus-
sion, one of the questions was whether or not we should remove from the set of
histories of the model a set of moments that would normally count as a history,
i.e. the two histories hl . In the present openness scenario instead, what is required
is that we add a history. That is, we need to add to the set of histories something
that normally would not count as a history, i.e. a broken history. Moreover, the
life on earth case does not seem to give a clear indication on what is preferable
between history-based and moment-based structures. The debate features differ-
ent positions, and, as I argued toward the end of section 3, it can be debatable
whether either of the arguments considered scores a clear point in favor of one of
the two structures over the other. On the other hand, the case of present openness
I discussed in section 4 clearly suggests an advantage of history-based structures.
The scenario of present openness seems to be a genuine metaphysical possibil-
ity. However, we need broken histories to model it, and broken histories can be
admitted only if we adopt history-based structures. Moment-based structures sim-
time. It can be noted, though, that a possible line of reply from the branching theorist could be to
argue that we should be careful and relativize our claims to histories. The moment m has no later
moments (it is Doomsday) relative to the broken-at-m history, whereas it has later moments only
relative to other histories passing through it.
21
ply cannot make room for broken histories. It follows that history-based structures
can represent a genuine metaphysical possibility that cannot be represented in the
framework of moment-based structures. If so, history-based structures score a
clear point against moment-based structures.
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